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GENERAL HUANG MU-SUNG AT LHASA, 1934 
-H. E. RICHARDSON 
It seems timely to follow up Dr. Sinha's interesting article "The Simla 
Convention 1914: a Chinese Puzzle" in the Bulletin of Tibetology, No. I 
(1977) with the story of an occasion when the Chinese were unwillingly re-
minded of the continuing effect of that document on Tibetan political thinking. 
The Chinese Government was quick to take advantage of the death of 
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama by sending a mission to Lhasa under General 
Huang Mu-sung, a high-ranking official, on the pretext of offering condo-
lences. Present at Lhasa during that visit was Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup, 
Assistant Political Officer in Sikkim to whom the Indian Government owes 
much gratitude for the influence' of his advice to the Tibetans and for the 
detailed information about the events of those six months which he was able 
to obtain through his long friendship with leading Tibetan officials. The 
negotiations which took place between the Chinese and the Tibetans have 
been summarized in my Tibet alld its History. pp 141-143 and in Tibet, a Polili-
cal History by Tsipon W.D. Shakabpa, pp 276, 277. Li Tieh-tseng in The 
Historical StallIs of Tibet, pp 168-177 gives a longer account but it re-arranges 
the sequence of events to some extent and uses terminology of a more technical 
western character than can be readily encompassed by the Tibetan vocabulary; 
it may be of interest, therefore, to put on record a fuller account of the ex-
changes derived from Tibetan sources. 
The first problem to face the new and ulltried Tibetan administration 
still deeply in the throes of internal intrigues, was the arrival of a radio set 
sent ahead of the general. Objections by the Kashag to its installation were 
ignored, but the Tibetans did not make an issue of this. 
When the mission arrived on 25th April Huang, who had sent in advance 
a proclamation that he was coming solely for religious purposes, was received 
with exceptional honours. He himself made a good impression by tireless 
and courteous diplomacy, by a display of reverence and piety in holy places 
and by lavish gifts and entertainments. His retinue proved less popular and 
offended Tibetan susceptibilities in many ways. They rode furiously through 
the streets of Lhasa, brawled among themselves and, surprisingly to the 
Tibetans, failed to show proper respect to their leader. They also complained 
about the playing of "British music"-probably including God Save the 
King !-by Tibetan military bands. The monh ",howed obvious dislike 
of the visitors and mocked and jostled Huang's escort so much that they had 
to be restrained by a special order. 
Huang's first move was to ofrer a seal and a memorial tablet for the late 
Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government at first refused on the ground that 
as the Dalai Lama was dead there was no need for a seal; but, under pressure 
and finding there was nothing compromising on the gifts, the Kasbllg after 
consulting the National Assembly agreed to accept them. Huang then asked 
that all the high officials should go to his headquarters to receive the objects; 
but eventually he went himself to the Potala to make the presentati on. 
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No one believed that Huang had come without any political purpose 
but, although he had private discussions with the Regent and high officials, 
he shrewdly refrained from making any formal overture. So, after sometime 
a meeting of the National Assembly was held at which it was decided to 
broach the question of the frontier,. making it clear that "while Tibet and China 
should be considered as two eyes", Tibet must remain independent. The 
Kashag accordingly raised the matter with Huang and also referred to their 
difficulties over the Panchen Lama. Huang told them that he had met the 
Panchen and was certain he had "0 intention of trying to return to Tibet by 
force. As for political matters he pretended that he had come solely on religi-
ous business and had no authority to enter any sort of negotiations. The 
Kashag pointed out that he had been described as second only to Ch'iang 
Kai-shek and must surely have some power. 
Huang then unfolded his brief. The Tibetan Government should declare 
themselves part of China as one of the Five Races and should set up a 
repu!J1ic. They should obey the instructions of the Central Government andin 
return they would be protected agai'1st all outsiders. 
The National A.sembly, which was consulted on al\ matters during 
Huang's visit, debated thCSI: proposals for two days and replied that Tibet 
had been ruled by thirteen Dalai Lamas and would never become a part of 
Chinese republic. They would defevd their independence to the last man 
against any invader. 
When the Kashag reported this to General Huang his urbanity was 
somewhat ruffled and he tried the effect of scarcely veiled threats. The 
Panchen Lama, he said, had joined the Chinese Republic and if he tried to 
return to Tibet by force the Chinese Government would do nothing to stop 
him. The Kashag were not impressed and reminded Huang of what he had 
told them a few days before. Nevertheless, the matter was agam referred 
to the National Assembly which re-affirmed its stand and signed a paper to 
that effect. 
Huang, obviously disappointed, telegraphed to Nanking for instructions 
and, although he was advised to return, he did not give up at once. In another 
meeting he watered down his demands, saying that membership of the Five 
Races did not necessarily mean adopting a repUblican government. The 
important thing was that Tibet should rely on China. He said that Great 
Britain in a treaty with Japan had acknowledged that Tibet was subject to 
China. The Tibetans replied that they knew of no such treaty and, if there 
were one, it would not affect them. As for China's ability to help, they asked 
what the Chinese had one for Mongolia and Manchuria. The National 
Assembly was consulted again. They bluntly rejected all Huang's proposals 
and stressed their friendship with the British Government whose treatment 
of them even after 1904 they described as fair. China was the only enemy 
they had to fear. 
Huang, determined to persist but not willing to risk the further loss of face, 
then handed over the negotiations to Wu Min-yuan a member of his staff who 
had been born in Lhasa to a Tibetan mother. Wu visited the Kashag and 
explained that Huang was too severely disappointed to do any more but that 
he himself had some informal suggestions to make. It was bdieved in Lhasa 
that before Wu's approach large presents had been given to leading officials 
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and it was expected that the Kashag might give way but that the National 
Assembly would stand firm. Wu's proposals, which were made in writing. 
were debated for several days both by the Kashag and the National Assembly. 
The points raised and the opi nion of each body on them are detailed below: 
). "Relations between the Central Government and the Tibetan 
Government should be those of benefactor and Lama". 
The Kashag accepted thi!! on condition that "Chinese Government"' 
should be substituted for "Central Government"'. The National Assembly 
agreed. 
:2. "The Chinese Government should lilways regard Tibet as a holy 
and religious country". Agreed. 
3. "Tibet has religion, men, and complete administrative arrangements. 
therefore China should consider Tibet to be independent and should not 
interfere in its internal administration". Agreed. 
4. "No Chinese troops should be kept on Tibet's frontiers". Agreed. 
5. "Five thousand troops should be selected from the Tibetan army as 
Frontier Guards. They should be posted on the various frontiers and China 
~hould pay. arm, and train the troops", 
The Kashag said troops could be posted on the frontiers bUl there was 
no need for a specially named force: and no payor arms were wanted from 
the Chinese Government. The Assembly said it was not necessary to post 
troops on the frontier unless an emergency arose. 
6. "A Chinese Officer should be posted at Lhasa to advise the Tibetan 
Government. He should be given an escort out of the Frontier Force and 
should control the l1lovemenh of the whole force". 
The Kashag preferred that no Chine:-.e officer should be posted at Lhasa. 
If one were appointed he should .have nothing to do with. the Tibetan army 
but he might have a small escort. The Simla agreement specified 300 men. 
The Ao:sembly :.;aid that 25 servants should .,uffice for an escort and any Chinese 
officer should strictly oblierve the conditi.on of non-interference in Tibetan 
internal affairs.. I 
7. "The Tibetan Government should consult the Chin'ese Government 
before corresponding with other l1ation~ about external afrairs". 
The Kashag said that Tibet is independent and would deal with its external 
affairs without consulting the Chinese. The Assembly agreed, adding that 
the Tibetan Government would correspond with all nations, "headed by the 
British", whenever they wanted. 
8. '~The Chinese Government <;hould be consulted abollt the appoint-
ment of officen; of the rank of Shappe and above." 
The Kashag refused but said that the Chinese Government could be 
informed after such appointments had been made. The Assembly agreed. 
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9. "China should recognize the boundary existing at the time of the 
Emperor Kuang Hsu". That apparently meant the frontier before the in-
vasion by Chao Erh Feng in 1908·1910. 
Both the Kashag and Assembly accepted that ,as favourable but demanded 
additional territory including Nyarong. Bathang, Lithang and the Golok 
country. 
10. "China should fight or else mediate with any nations that try to 
invade Tibe(,. 
The Kas'hag and Assembly replied that as Tibet is a religious country 
no one is likely to attack her .. If anyone does, Tibet will deal with them with-
out Chinese help. The question of mutual help could be considered if it arose. 
11. "China should be informed when the incarnation of a Dalai Lama 
is discovered 50 that the Chinese Government can offer him a seal and a title". 
The Kashag agreed. The National Assembly said that China should be 
informed only after the installation had taken place in order to avoid trouble 
such as was created in the case of the Sixth and Seventh Dalai Lamas. 
12. "The Tibetan Government should invite the Panchen Lama to return 
at once, should restore to him his former powers, estates and property. and 
should guarantee that no harm should fall on him or his followers. If that 
were done the Chinese Govern,mentwould take away his arms and munitions". 
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The Kashag and Assembly replied that the Panchen Lama being a reli-
gious person required no arms or ammunition; they would welcome him back 
and guarantee his personal safety if the Chinese took away his arms. They 
added that he should be asked to return via India in accordance with the 
wishes of the late Dalai Lama. 
13. "All Tibetan officers in China should receive salaries from 
the Chinese Government". 
The Kashag agreed. The Assembly said it was a matter of indifference 
to them but only officials appointed by the Tibetan.Government should attend 
meetings. ., 
14. "All half-Chinese in Tibet should be under the sole jurisdiction 
of the Chinese officer at Lhasa". 
The Kashag and Assembly replied that when the Chinese were turned 
out of Tibet in 1912 the Tibetan Government asked all Chinese to return to 
China. Those born in Tibet sought permission to remain and signed an 
agreement to pay taxes and submit to Tibetan jurisdiction. This article was, 
therefore, inacceptable. 
On receiving these replies Huang wrote to the Kashag asking that alI 
of Wu Min-yuan's proposals should be accepted and laying particular stress 
on three demands: I. that Tibet should admit subordination to China; 
2. that all direct correspondence with outside nations should cease or, failing 
34 
that, China should be consulted before appoinfments were made to the 
post of Shappe or higher ranks. 
After long deliberation the National, Assembly decided I. that Tibet 
might be considered subordinate to China to the extent and on the terms laid 
do~¥O in the Simla treaty; 2. that Tibet would correspond with all nations, 
headed by the British, and would not consult the Chinese Government on the 
subject: 3. in view of religious ties. Tibet would inform China after the appoint-
ment of officers of the rank of Shappe' and above. 
The Nationnl Assembly expressly desired that the British Government 
should be a party to any agreement reached between Tibet and China. Huang 
refused bluntly to consider this last proposal but referred the other replies 
to Nanking. He was then ordered to return to China for consultation and 
he left Lhasa towards the end of October. 
1 believe thnt to a generally accurate record of events between April 
and October 1934 and it is largely confirmed by the account of Li Tieh-tseng 
who admits in conclusion that the Tibetan authorities were not yet ready to 
place their trust nnd reliance on the Chinese Government of the day. The 
best success he can claim is that the Tibetans were willing in principle to re-
sume full relationship once the overall differences were settled. The magni-
tude of those difrerences shown by repeated Tibetan assertions of their in-
dependence is something Mr. Li does not stress; and when in 1935 Mr. 
Williamson asked the Tibetan Government I1bout their views on Chinese 
suzerainty they stated that the Simla Convention in exchange for territorial 
concession~ from the Chinese they had definitely not accepted even the nominal 
suzerainty of China in their talks with General Huang. 
Although. in the event. it was shown that the conditions of the Simla 
Convention remained the guiding ,principle of the Tibetan Governmen" the 
British Government realized that by consenting in 1933 to the Tibetans attemp-
ting to reach a direct agreement with China provided it did not prejudice their 
obligations to the British Government. they had allowed a departure from the 
Simla Convention which might have led to an agreement being reached from 
which they were excluded. The earliest opportunity was, therefore, tuken 
of letting the Tibetan Government know that the British Government would 
expect to be represented at any further such negotiations. 
The Chinese, moreover. had succeeded in making a small hole in the 
Simla agreements by leaving a small liaison mission at Lhasa: but by so doing 
they attracted a countervailing British Mission which continued in existence 
after August 1947 as the Indian Mission and i.n 1954 was converted in,to a 
Consulate-General. 
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